In Wait for Varangians

A. Sekretarev,  1996.
In Wait for Varangians

Stagnation, perestroika, dissolution of the Soviet Union, rise of independent state – all these dramatic periods experienced Ukraine in the last two decades of its history. Like Russia, by the way. And now a new period starts, its essence – selection of the way for development.
Unlike the previous, rather related to destruction and hence rather static and closed, the new period must become creative, and so – dynamic and demanding broader view on the surrounding world. Since creative motion of a state is impossible if this state does not fit into more general and deeper process of development of the whole civilization to which this state belongs.
“One does not choose civilization” – it is true for states to the same extent as the similar sentence about the motherland is true for an individual person. But if a person can leave his/her motherland, for a state immigration from the civilization is impossible – the age of great migrations of nations has gone to the past.
Meanwhile, even when staying in motherland, a person can forget it, forget his/her ancestors, forget kinfolks, and so doom himself/herself to destructive loneliness. The same hazard exists for a state too - to be torn off its civilization, ignore laws of its development and interests of neighbours – means to doom the state to vegetation, if not to catastrophe.
It is especially essential in the current epoch, when unprecedented development of communications turned the globe into a single area of world politics, where not separate national states, but civilizations cooperate and oppose each other.

Slavic world: civilization or outskirts?

During practically the whole periods of new and modern history, i.e. starting from the middle of ÕVII century, Ukraine and Russia were within a united state. That is why the history of interrelations of the state and civilization was practically the same for the both now independent states.
The question of questions for the history of these interrelations is the sacramental one: - does Slavic civilization with its own way of development and Russian center exist, or Slavic states are outskirts of the western civilization and are being developed in accordance with laws of its evolution?
Just two quotations.
“Now in Russia occurs the same what have occurred in the West: it moves to capitalism … , Russia must enter it. This is an inevitable world law.”
“Russia has its own separate history and social structure and … will be free from the yoke of capital and bourgeoisie and class struggle.”
These statements are taken not from the modern electoral campaigns. They were said exactly a century ago.
The first one belongs to the Finance Minister of the Russian Empire S Vitte, the second - to that time deputy Home Minister V Pleve.
Though, the dispute if the Slavic world headed by Russia is a civilization started in the beginning of the XIX century. It was held by Normannists and Slavinists, then by Westerners and Slavophils. Well, even reformers and patriots nowadays dispute about it.
Meanwhile, in the West too where look on Slavic world as outskirts of Western civilization prevails, some reputable specialists like Samuel Huntington, director of the Harvard University Strategic studies Institute, admit existence of a separate Orthodox-Slavic civilization.
Seems, this dispute is an endless one, first – due to dimness of such polysemantic category as “civilization”, second – due to variability of political conjuncture, which most often stimulates it.
But if we raise the question in practical area, namely – what caused greater influence: evolution of the Western world on the Slavic or vice versa –then the answer seems to be much more definite.
300-years long flow of new ideas, techniques, specialists from the West is incomparable to the reverse flow. Moreover, (below we’ll consider in detail) all local cardinal reforms – from Peter I to Gorbachev, happened after great transformations in the center of civilization – technological revolutions, and, hence, were their consequences.
Remember, where all the Empire dissidents used to go, starting with Hertzen. All they – narodniks, social democrats, and postwar dissidents fled to the West. Just there they got ideological and material feeding, strengthened their influence in the Empire – and, at last, its desired transformations occurred.
Seems, it is enough that the term “outskirts Empire” used further, was, at least, acceptable.
To prevent various objections, I note now – to accept that you are a dweller of the civilization outskirts is not an easy thing. “Are we more stupid, or what?” – a man in the street may be outraged and start the list of names and events – from Anna Yaroslavna, the French Queen, to Gagarin, from Mamay Battle to the fall of Berlin.
As for the fact that we are not more stupid, it is undoubted. But we are not more stupid as individuals, so to say from nature. But if we deal with collectives – either a factory, or a company, or city community or, at last the whole country, here we – how to soothe the statement – are very far from perfection. And it is when the cult of community, collective pierces the whole our history, though, not very long. Superiority of a community over a person was revealed in the fact that our collectives were always created rather by force, than creative idea. And a person felt constrained in such collectives.
As one of the early Slavophils said, “a Russian man, considered separately, will not get to paradise, while you should not let the whole village there.” Well, probably the matter is that archaic community paradise, where the whole village feels free, is so poor and cramped for a separate individual – for a personality!
So, if we speak of us as of society, then we, alias, so far are more stupid in fact. Or, if you please, we are younger.
And now about our victories and, in general, about our contribution to the Wîrld history.
Nothing surprising in the fact that for three hundred years the outskirts have been rapidly developed too and sometimes got impressive results. But still remaining outskirts.
To realize it, one needs to have broad views, namely – when touching a specific event in the Empire’s history, including the ones with its participation, should pay attention at what at that time occurred in the centre of the Western civilization. Very often that was an impetus, original cause of the events that took place in outskirts history.
By the way, just this broadness of views was insufficient in the Imperial historiography, and in formed under its influence public view at history. Here on the contrary, ruled excessive “narcissism”, i.e. tendency to consider the history of outskirts, first of all, to be the result of implementation of outskirts initiatives.

Peter’s reforms: who was the initiator?
A lot was said about Peter I “who cut window to Europe”, – it is he who is considered to be the principal initiator of reforms at outskirts. But Karl Marks, for example, regarded Russian modernization as the work of England. He directly says about it in his work “Disclosure of the 18th century diplomatic history”, which was published in Russian only… in 1989!
Some quotations from it:
“…doesn’t the very fact that transformation of Moscovia into Russia was done by its transformation from semi-Asiatic continental state into the principal sea power at the Baltic sea, lead us to the conclusion that England – the greatest see power of that time, moreover, located at the exit from the Baltic sea, who starting from the middle of 17th century preserved the role of the supreme arbitrator, should be involved in this change?”
“…real history will show that England not to the less extent promoted fulfillment of the Peter’s and his heirs’ plans, than the Golden Horde khans did for fulfillment of thoughts of Ivan ²²² and his predecessors.” (Here creation of Moscovian state is meant– A. S.)
 The contemporary to Peter I English pamphlets, well known in the whole Europe, said that “…his (Peter’s) fleet should rather be called Dutch, than Moscovian”, that beside ships of Dutch make, by 1717 there were “more than a dozen of vessels built in England”.
So, the centre of civilization considered creation of the fleet to be more their, than Russian initiative.
It is mainly explained by the will of advanced see powers, first of all England, to get such important strategic goods as ship timber and hemp fibers not from hardly accessible Archangel, but from closer Baltic ports.
As the result of manufacturing revolution of century, of mastering in long distance navigation “trade turned into vital necessity for our state. (England – A.S.) What food means for life, supply of shipbuilding materials means for fleet.”(quotation from that pamphlets).
At the end of ÕV²² century the Baltic Sea was controlled by Sweden, rather strong power and hardly controlled from outside. While creation of renovated Russia, whose sea power at the Baltic Sea became well-controlled mean of pressure on Sweden, ensured supplies to the centre of civilization, the core of which was England, with Russian ship timber and hemp fibers from the most convenient ports.
At the background of these deep and powerful global-scale processes, the dramatic well-known details of internal Russian life at the epoch of Peter look like everyday trifles important only for their direct participants.
And one more powerful factor that determined modernization of outskirts as the result of not purely own initiatives, but of the situation in the centre of civilization. It is related to the inertia of processes of the mentioned technological revolution.
In the ÕV²² century sea trade was an innovation, which needed involvement of courageous and risky people, the innovation that guaranteed fantastic profit when an expedition was a success. This trade attracted the most active and enterprising stratum of the population of the Atlantic countries. An epidemic flee of sons “to the sea” became a real tragedy for traditional reputable English families. Many of them were lost forever, but those who returned in short period turning into such rich persons that century-long efforts of a squire dynasty looked like children’s toys.
But by the beginning of the ÕV²²² century long-distance navigation turned into a routine business where powerful trading companies took over the initiative, while huge formed by that time army of sea adventurers was ousted from the business. Salaries of seamen dropped down drastically. Payments for their work were strictly regulated by authorities – at the beginning of the ÕV²²² century imperial Act that limited seamen’s requirements for salaries was adopted.
The reaction was the powerful rise of piracy. In seaports revolts provoked by merchant ships crews broke out from time to time, say, in Boston in 1690ies, in New York in 1705, where the quarter of population was linked to sea trade.
The number of ships that safely returned back from long voyages grew up, since both the art of shipbuilding and navigation grew up. That is why a number of earlier built shipyards, shipwrights felt lack of orders. 
It is clear, that when at the background of such problems new vast Russian market appears, which needed various services related to navigation, the whole army of “Varangians” from Holland, England and other sea powers rushed there.


Do Varangians exist at all?
Under “Varangians” I do not mean those semi-legendary contemporaries of Rurik – we’ll not go to such deep history. Let’s be limited by later times and call “Varangians” the whole lot of incomers to the outskirts empire from the centre of civilization during those 300 years.
Impact of the borrowed from the centre ideas, technologies, investments for the outskirts empire development, I guess, even jingoists will not object. But what is more important, especially during periods of reforms in the outskirts, those were human “injections” from the centre. Their scale and value were usually concealed. I guess that was one of the most shaded pages of the imperial history.
For further convincingness, let me present some facts.
The fact that more than half of naval officer in the Russian fleet at Peter’s time and practically all naval Command were foreigners, and that such situation lasted during the whole ÕV²²² century – would not surprise the readers – for all that, navy and fleet were innovations in the empire.
But the fact that by the middle of Õ²Õ century in tsarist Russia there were over 500 foreign agricultural colonies, mainly German, I don’t think is widely known. More impressive is the fact that in Kherson province, which includes modern Kherson, Nikolaev, a part of Odessa regions and left-bank Moldova, in 1913 there were 150 thousand of German colonists who owned one third of all arable lands in the province, which was one of the European granaries. Altogether in the Empire at that time worked – and worked hard! – about 1 million population of 2070 German colonies, and in the territory of modern Ukraine – over 500 thousand.
And that was in rural area only. How did the picture look like in towns and cities?
As from small towns and settlements, there were very few foreigners there – they had nothing to do there. While the picture was different in industrial centers of the Empire. In Petersburg at the beginning of the ÕÕ century there were about 4 thousand Swedes only, majority of them were high-class specialists – qualified workers, technicians, engineers, and medical personnel. To say nothing of Petersburg Germans!
When after the February Revolution of 1917 the question was set of calling the Constituent Assembly in Petrograd (that was the Slavic variant of the German name of the capital of the country that was in war against Germany), many influential people of that time proposed to call it in Moscow.
“ Moscow is an aboriginal Russian city … To call the Constituent Assembly in Petrograd, which with its bureaucratic and international character was always hostile to Russian life, it would be an illogical and unnatural gesture”. This is a quotation from the famous general’s Brusilov telegram.
Meanwhile, one of the leaders of influential Cadet party V.A. Maklakov said to the French Ambassador more definitely about the national character of that time Imperial capital:
“Its real name is Petersburg, it is a German city, which does not have right to be called by Slavic name.”
That’s the Russian capital! And not just a capital – Petrograd housed almost a half of all hi-tech enterprises of the Empire – that was the real cause of its Germanization.
Though, there were lots of foreigners not only in agriculture and industry, but there were lots of them at the highest strata of the Empire.
Among 2867 of the highest officers of the Empire – chancellors, senators, ministers during the period from 1700 to 1917, there were 1079 foreigners, mostly Western Europeans and first of all Germans, that is 37,6%!
That’s the Varangians! Well, they really could be found everywhere, and, first of all, they were where new industrial centres were created, depopulated lands were developed in the Empire or in public administration.
Their, now forgotten, presence was felt by everybody at that time. Papers swarmed with publications, which compared flourishing German settlements to their neighbours – neglected villages. Realization of own backwardness made that time Slavophils mad and inspired humorists.
Just an example – short ironical poem from the “Slavic Thoughts” cycle, published in the “Svistok” (the Whistle) magazine at the beginning of 1860ies. It says that steamships of that time were of foreign make and their captains were mostly foreigners.

“Quickly runs our steamship, but is driven with a dead machine
Barge goes slowly but is wisely towed.
At shallow places the captain orders to do measuring:
I appeal to the West: MEASURE THE DEPTH OF RUSSIAN SPIRIT!
Whatever did the captain to pass by the bank cautiously, -
But stopped!..Well, a German is unable to cope with the beauty of Russian rivers!..
A German is our captain, but all stokers are Russians;
That is the reflection of Russian valour – obedience!”

And this is a quotation from the “Loyal Speeches” by Ì.Å. Saltykov-Schedrin (1872-1876):
“Well, again the road. And again on both sides swarm Germans, and again Germans. Is a pad a bit cozier, then certainly a German putters there, cuts, pierces, saws, removes stumps. And all they are just pioneers, scouts, who will be followed by the whole army …
- Now Russians deal with taverns, - the driver as if answers my secret thought, - the rest went to Germans”.
In general, it wonders exceedingly, that lots of facts that show the Western role in developing the outskirts empire are not collected together, and very little studied.
Some more examples – though it is a drop in the ocean.
The firs railway in Russia was designed and built in 1837 by foreign specialists headed by A.F. Herstner, an Austrian born in Czechia. The railway was equipped with English steam locomotives. Jingoism found relief in calling the locomotives with purely Russian names - “Bogatyr” (ethic hero), “Russia”, and memorial medal bore an inscription: “The builder of the first railway Franz Herstner, Czech by birth, of the same kin as Russians”
Everything that determined, in particular, industrial development of Ukraine – mining and metallurgy, railway network, sugar and sugar beetroot production, agricultural machine building – all those were created with the decisive participation of Western specialists and capitals.
Moreover, not separate plants were built, but industrial areas with allied industries and communications.
Creation in 1870ies of Krivorozhsko-Donetskiy industrial region, after two failed attempts to do it with own efforts, was, at last, successfully completed by English, Belgian and French specialists and businessmen headed by John Hughes. Caucasian oilfields, production of all kinds of oil fuels, delivery of fuel to customers – all those were the results of the activities of English and, first of all, Swedish businessmen – famous brothers Nobel.
For example, at Podillia, so called sugar Donbass foreigners, beside sugar refineries, built plant-breeding station, seed plant, superphosphate production plant, built narrow-gauge railway network that connected beetroot plantations to sugar refineries.
All Ukraine in the 2nd half of Õ²Õ century swarmed with ploughs, seeders and other agricultural machinery with German trademarks. Moreover, the major part of the machinery was produced not abroad, but in Elisavetgrad (Kirovograd), Berdiansk and other Ukrainian Southern cities, at the plants built by German colonists. Those were the largest plants in the Imperial industry.
As Richard Pipes, well-known American Sovietologist, professor of Russian history in Harvard said, “weaving mills established by serf businessmen in central regions of the country (I think, it is a mistake, - the mechanization of weaving was an innovation (in the West) and borrowing (in the East) of the previous, preindustrial epoch – A.S.) comprised the single industry really created by Russians … Only after foreigners took main risks, Russian capital came to heavy industry. Due to that at the eave of the Revolution 1/3 of industrial capital investments and half of bank capital of the largest banks were of foreign origin ”.
So, it is undoubtedly that the West industrialized pre-revolution Ukraine, as well as the whole Empire.
The same was in Soviet period. All modern plants, power stations, including Dneproges, were mainly built after Western projects and under supervision of Western specialists. Planned development of the same Ukrainian industrial regions created before the Revolution went on.
As for the agriculture, especially Ukrainian, the succession was broken by the collectivization. Let's make the essential notice. The matter is that unlike the German colonies in the Volga region, where even before the Revolution communal land tenure of Russian type prevailed, that comparatively easy fitted the collectivization, the majority of German colonists in Ukraine were individual farmers. It is understandable that collectivization there was more destructive.

As for the postwar Soviet period, it is characterized, especially started from the 50ies, by essential gap between the outskirts empire and the West. Borrowing of ideas from the centre stopped even earlier, borrowing human resources were limited to income of German specialists from occupied Germany. Only technological borrowing, mainly illegal, went on.
Though industrialization of the Empire at that time was rather fast, the country as the result of this gap turned to be unable to accept the postindustrial technological revolution that started in the West.
The centre entered the new epoch, while outskirts remain in the previous industrial one. And that meant that stagnation and decay of the outdated production were inevitable.
Now, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, both Ukraine and Russia face the task of attracting Western investments and, using them, enter the new epoch of their civilization development. But is it possible if the main role is given to financial and technological support, and large-scale involvement of “Varangians” is avoided? Alas, lessons of history say – it is impossible.
I should note, at least by the way, that the lots of Varangians were accepted by local people in general loyally. Despite the large number of, say, German colonists, there were no “German Pogroms” in Ukraine. Xenophobia was cultivated rather in the top of society, I think the reasons “why” are well knownïî ïîíÿòíûì, ÿ äóìàþ, ïðè÷èíàì.
When do they come?
Strangers from the center used to appear in outskirts in all times. The streams of human exchange flow among the nations permanently. But, from time to time, these streams turn in great flows. Many different reasons cause it.
In the history of the Outskirts Empire of ÕV²²-ÕÕ centuries there were two periods when influx of people from the centre of civilization was so powerful that it was practically decisive factor in the development of the outskirts. Those were the time of Peter’s reforms and the middle of Õ²Õ century.
I think it necessary to gain an understanding of the variety of causes of the both phenomena, since those times were very similar to the current time.
Following the above-mentioned “broadness of views”, let’s look at what happened at those periods in the centre of civilization. And there we find out that those were the completion phases of the two technological revolutions. Manufacturing, or as it also called pre-industrial, at Peter’s time, and industrial revolution at the middle of Õ²Õ century.
As it has already been said, now the centre of civilization is in the similar situation – postindustrial technological revolution is close to completion there.
Though revolutionary technical innovations are the time marks of technological revolutions – (such a mark for pre-industrial revolution is e.g. an ocean sailing ship, for industrial – steam engine, and computer – for postindustrial revolution), the basic and very fast renewal occurs not only in technologies, but in the whole society of the centre of civilization. Ways of life, ideologies are changed, new mass specialties, new strata appear, redistribution of influence between the social strata occurs. Character of international cooperation changes, new markets of goods and services emerge.
Denationalization of production is one the decisive results of the modern industrial revolution. Now not the volume of material goods produced in the country is the measure of the developed country wealth, but rather the number of its population involved in the production of the nowadays most valuable products - information.
The most privileged modern stratum that provides with symbolical-analytical services (as defined by Robert Rhime, professor of Harvard University, adviser of President Clinton) includes now scientific researchers, designers, certain engineers, computer specialists, investing bankers, lawyers, advisers, advertising specialists, mass media, publishers and the like. As R Rhime assessed, these specialists make 1/5 of the USA population, but own over half of the national income.
The similar basic changes in the centre of civilization happened as the result of the two previous technological revolutions – both manufacturing and industrial.

It is interesting that in these three cases the same scheme of interaction of the centre of civilization and its outskirts is seen.
At the beginning, when the process of technological revolution emerges (of course in the centre), outskirts are, so to say, capsulated, kept away from new influence. This gap between the centre causes stagnation of the outskirts. Moreover, the outskirts frequently treat such stagnation as the sign of stability and traditions. Ambitions and illusions regarding their role in the world history grow up.
Then, when technological revolution passes through its first, often dramatic, phase leads to the modernization of the centre, crisis emerges at outskirts: in technological, in military-political, and in social-economical relations, the outskirts become noncompetitive, drops out from the formed renewed international infrastructure of the centre of civilization.
And, finally, the crisis urges the outskirts to launch reforms, whose ultimate goal is modernization of the outskirts. Seems, that in this process next “call for Varangians” becomes an indicator of efficiency.
Just how similar look pre-reform events at the outskirts at the time of completion of manufacturing, industrial and postindustrial revolutions in the centre of civilization.
The second half of the ÕV²² century in Russia can be treated as the period of stagnation and crisis. The best indicators of the country’s conditions at those cruel times are wars. So, the whole chain of Òàê âîò, öåëàÿ ñåðèÿ unsuccessful campaigns against Turks and Tatars whose armies were very backward, eloquently say about the decay of Russia. Urban population in the middle of the ÕV²² century was just a little over 500 thousand; moreover, cities and towns were practically big villages where artisans and town folk were minorities.
That is, obviously, the outskirts have not yet stepped from the medieval time into manufacturing epoch with its growth of production, cities and trade, which at that time reigned in Europe.
Excessive ideological ambitions and claims of the “Third Rome” – how Moscow was often called at that time – were characteristic features of the pre-Peter stagnation. Xenophobia, first of all towards the West, was cultivated everywhere. Entrance of foreigners to Russia was strictly controlled by the authorities, and those who were allowed to enter, were settled in specified places, they were to wear only foreign clothes. To talk to a foreigner in a street meant to become a person suspected in alleged state treason.
“What are the foreign customs for us – their clothing is not for us, while ours is not for them ” – said A.L. Ordyn-Naschokin, the head of Ambassadors Order, the Foreign Ministry of pre-Peter’s Russia.
And now about stagnation-crisis events in Russia in times that preceded great reforms of 1860ies.
At the time when impetuous process of industrial revolution was under way in the centre of civilization, when in 1807 serfage was cancelled even in the most archaic Prussia, Russia was still in the epoch of manufactures. What industrialization can we speak about if the majority of the Empire’s population were serf and semi-serf peasants. Self-governing was absent even in cities and towns whose dwellers, except for few greatest cities, very little differed from peasants.
“We live only with present time, in the closest its limits, without past and without future, amongst the dead stagnation ” – this is how in 1836 Peter Chaadaev characterized that time Empire in his famous “Philosophic Letters”.
And again imperial ambitions and enormously inflated Slavophilism grew up. Victory over Napoleon still intoxicated heads of the rulers who dreamed to settle at the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, to become a centre of Panslavic world. But alas, all that ended in the loss of the Crimean War and ban to keep navy in the Black Sea.
Technological lagging of the Empire was clearly demonstrated in naval and land battles. Practically completely sail navy looked like helpless museum pieces when it met English and French steam-driven men-of-war.
I cannot ignore new rise of xenophobia. Otto von Bismarck who came to Russia in 1859 as an envoy, noted extreme antipathy to everything foreign from the side of the most active part of the authorities.
I guess, the stagnation and crisis of 70-80ies of XX century is rather well known and there is no need to describe it in detail. Let me only note its similar symptoms – technological lagging (at this time – presence in the industrial epoch wile the centre of civilization moved to the postindustrial one), isolation from the centre (notorious iron curtain), and finally, those very empire ambitions (now as a centre of all progressive(!) mankind).
Thanks to God, all that ended not in a war (though just remember the Caribbean crisis), but in economical and then political loss of the outskirts.
So we have considered periods prior to the reforms of Peter I, Alexander II and Gorbachev. The results of the first two were the transition, following the centre, of the outskirts to the next epochs of development – manufacturing and industrial. So, let us hope that Gorbachev’s successors in Russia and in Ukraine will be able to resolve the similar problem and our countries will enter the postindustrial world.
But transition of the outskirts into a new epoch is unrealizable without participation of its creator and carrier – the centre of civilization, moreover, direct participation – financial, technological assistance is not enough in this case – all that will “stick” in the archaic structure of the outskirts, which live after the laws of the past. Only a new epoch man organically joins all its renewed values. New epoch means, first of all, new people. And construction of this new epoch or, rather, its outskirts’ version without humans to be followed after – it is unreal task.
But inflow of “Varangians” cannot happen without bilateral readiness to it – outskirts must ‘will’ to accept strangers from the centre, by creating favourable conditions for their activities, and, in its turn, conditions that stimulate inflow of people from the centre to the outskirts.
What can attract them? Higher salaries, possibility of quick career, chances to implement his/her ideas – all what can be called profit in the broadest sense of this word. But this self-interest of individuals at whom a dweller of outskirts concentrates his/her attention, in historical aspect is just a propeller, a transportation mean with a help of which new ideas come from the centre.
Moreover, in the centre itself integral factors that push varangians appear. Among them a certain inertia of revolutionary processes, which lead to excessive saturation of central society with products of new epoch – specialists of “fashionable” professions, various companies, enterprises and firms, etc., educational structures for them. Surplus of them appears, competition gets harder. Besides, a part of central society appears whose interests, in this or that way, contradict to the revolutionary process.
So, if by that time outskirts realize the need in human, staff borrowings from the centre and appropriate reforms have already been implemented, then inflow of Varangians to outskirts becomes inevitable.
Certainly, the suggested scheme does not claim for comprehensive representation of the complicated process of the outskirts modernization after the technological revolution in the centre of civilization. But at least it is clearly seen in the two implemented outskirts modernizations of the new time. And current developments of the coming modernization seem to be within the frameworks of the same scheme.
Lessons of borrowings

Borrowings from the centre are, probably, the natural determining moment in development of the outskirts of civilization. There is nothing humiliating in it, as in any natural phenomenon.
Moreover, this process of borrowing is very complex, such that demands maximal creative efforts from the outskirts. To turn borrowing into part and parcel of the own life, introduce an innovation in the outskirts’ tradition, is very delicate and, alas, not always successful, deed.
Any idea or technology borrowed from the center is a product of the centre’s development, that is born as if “from beneath”. While in the outskirts the most frequent way of introducing the borrowing is “from top”. Moreover, there is a real threat of borrowing only the result, but not the process that bring the result.
Consider the Peter’s, and in general, Russian fleet and Navy. Borrowings there were done in very utilitarian way – first of all, in the military area. In Russia, during the XVIII – first half of XIX centuries, powerful sea business did not appear, fleet did not turn into an instrument of public enrichment. And how that could happen in the in general illiterate and non-democratic country. Sea fleet, that was one of the modern technologies of that time, required inflow of free, enterprising and educated people. But the Russia of nobility could hardly “supply” such people; moreover, exploitation of serfs provided the semi-literate nobility with more reliable profits, than risky and complex sea enterprises.
That is why the Russian fleet, which appeared to be quite alien to the Russian society, decayed from time to time. The state when realized that, again invested to it, again called Varangians, but time passed and everything was repeated.
“We have ships and men in excess, but we neither have fleet, navy, nor sailors … it must be admitted that our ships look like those ones that each year sail from Holland to catch herring, but not like warships” – these words Katherine II said after inspection of the Baltic Navy in 1765 ãîäó.
Then modernization of fleets started, first of all – of navy. But domestic shipbuilding was never raised to the European level. Lifetime of a Russian-build ship was 6 years while foreign ships could sail 20 and more years.
By the beginning of the XIX century fleet again came to the catastrophic decay – even “Committee for Fleet Formation” was formed. It collected and analyzed the data of several decades and drew a conclusion: ships built in England are not only of better quality, but cost much less than ships built in Russia.
And, despite great investments to the Navy, it by the beginning of the Crimean War was hopelessly obsolete.
Moreover, military achievements of the Russian Navy if compared to decisive actions of the Army looked very miserable.
As the chairman of the Committee for Fleet Formation A.R. Vorontsov said “sending of our squadrons (Ushakov’s and Sviridov”s – AS) to the Mediterranean Sea and other far voyages cost the State much, gave some tinsel, but, but were of no use ”.
In general, Russian navy – it’s a long story to tell – it is such a brilliant example of non-creative, forcible borrowing “from top”; moreover, all that to the great extent is true for the nowadays time.
At Soviet time, creation of military-industrial complex, that “empire inside the empire”, enveloped with the mist of secrecy rather to cover the scale of technological thefts from the West, than to hide its achievements – it is another bright example of conservative, non-genetic borrowings.
Under the state monopoly, without competition and economical expediency – without all that existed in the West where advanced technologies more often were the results of the general development of the system, closed and economically corrupted military-industrial complex, like earlier mentioned Navy took from the state much more than it could contribute to its development.
And here is one more example of unsuccessful borrowings. It is related to the disunity of the outskirts’ society.
The matter is that ambitions of the authorities to catch up with and overtake the centre of civilization led to the phenomenon when a borrowing was directed to the most appropriate, rather narrow stratum where artificial conservatory conditions were created to facilitate the introduction of the borrowings. As the result, such stratum lost contact with the whole outskirts’ society, majority of which were in the archaic, far from modernization state. Internal stress emerged in the society, something like static electricity charge. In the best case it was limited to the lack of dynamism, in the worse case – “disruption” occurs – crisis, decay, internal conflict.
Such disunity of the society as a result of “non-genetic” borrowings was seen by many.
“By bringing upper classes closer to the West and separating lower classes from it, the Peter’s reforms thus increased distrust of the latter to all that was coming to us from Europe ” – these are the words of G.V. Plekhanov.
“One of the most disturbing symptoms – it is that deep moat, that abyss that separates the upper classes of Russian society from the masses. There are no ties between those two groups; as if centuries separate them” – this is how at the eave of the Revolution of 1917 French Ambassador Maurice Paleologe saw the imperial society.
As for the nowadays time, I guess, the most laconic phrase about that very disunity in the USSR is deadly precise definition “Upper Volta with missiles” by Margaret Thatcher.
For sure, all those lessons of borrowings are of great importance now, when both Ukraine and Russia stand at the threshold of the new postindustrial epoch created again in the centre of the civilization. Will Varangians bring it to us, will we accept the innovations in the way that they will harmonically be included in our tradition, or again the society will be split? Only time can show it.
  (Translated by V. Tarasjuk)