Political philosophy of the Crimean War of 1853-18

Political philosophy of the Crimean War of 1853-1856. Essay

Acquaintance with the details of the siege of Sevastopol leads to a natural question: why was such a bloody, labor-consuming and expensive project needed?

Could be found a number of answers of different levels.

1. To deprive the Russian Black Sea Fleet of a naval base,
2. To eliminate the Black Sea Fleet of Russia,
3. To protect Turkey ...

Answers can be given in different ways and with using different wordings.

We have to make a small digression.

Why Sevastopol?

The answer may be as follows. Sevastopol was the most convenient point for the application of the UNITED EFFORTS OF THE MAJOR ALLIES - Great Britain, France and Turkey. All other theaters of action were less convenient for the combined efforts of the allies.

Let's get back to the question “why?” (what were the goals?). ”

Answers can be found in official documents. You can try to find answers by analyzing the situation and actions. The second way leads to the appearance of hypothetical judgments.

We will go along the path of analysis and of a making hypothetical judgments.

As for the Great Britain, perhaps the purpose of this state can be formulated as follows. “Stop the actions of Russia aimed at upsetting the balance of interests in Europe and Asia (as well as in other regions).”

Such a general statement of the question (of the purpose) was quite effective. A lot of events could lead to the achievement of such a goal.

French interests at that time were expressed by Napoleon III. What were his interests? There is a temptation to issue a very scientifically formulations.

But the right to formulate hypothetical judgments allows us to make a hypothesis:

Napoleon III sought revenge for the war of 1812.

How to take revenge?

Achieve the defeat of Russia, achieve a changing of the ruling Romanov dynasty.

His goals include the defense of Turkey. And, under favorable circumstances, the transfer of Crimea under Turkish rule ...

If we focus on the opinions of historiographers about the position of Napoleon III, we can come to the conclusion that the siege of Sevastopol itself was to him of relatively little interest. To a greater or equal extent, he was interested in the occupation of Crimea. Somewhere, on the periphery of official plans, there was an option - the transfer of Crimea to Turkey with favorable conditions for France.

Events did not allow Napoleon III to go to the Crimean (Sevastopol) theater of military operations.

Closely affiliated with Napoleon III, the command (Saint-Arnaud and Canrobert) faced a very difficult task. The strategic ideas of their superior, Emperor Napoleon III, may not have been available to them. Saint-Arnaud died early enough at the beginning of the campaign, and Canrobert gave the impression of a passive person.

Why did he make such an impression?

One of the answers to this question is the opinion that he did not understand why all this was necessary and for what all this.

General P;lissier was affiliated with the emperor, apparently to a lesser extent (if to compare with his predecessors as commander).

He set a specific military task - to take Sevastopol. This did not quite correspond to the plans of Napoleon III, however, it was in the interests of the army concentrated nearby Sevastopol and in the interests of Great Britain.

Perhaps the general diplomatic position of Great Britain supported the plans and actions of General P;lissier.

As a result, the Allied victory at Sevastopol led to peace Treaty of Paris (1856). Russia has limited her foreign policy activity to such an extent that in 1868 she sold Alaska.

We will not touch on the sale of Alaska. We note the fact that foreign policy activity was limited and was focused on internal affairs - on reforms.

From this, as they say, it was necessary to  Nikolai Pavlovich to begin with.

Of course, he wanted to do something more glorious - to achieve victory in Hungary (in that row, also, the pacification of the uprisings in the former Commonwealth - Rech Pospolita), to explain the norms of behavior for Turkey ...

The fragile international balance was in dangerous situation ...

Great Britain felt a threat to the existing balance of interests in Europe and Asia. However, this is a repetition of the above.

October 7, 2019 15:39

Translation from Russian into English: October 7, 2019  16:45.
Владимир Владимирович Залесский «Политическая философия Крымской войны 1853-1856 годов. Очерк».