There Was NO Stab in the Back in Great War

The infamous “stab in the back” theory (grossly incorrect) became another colossal “slab” in the “stack of slabs” that (after a critical mass had been accumulated) launched the “Holocaust Avalanche” killing four million Jews.

Adolf Hitler and most other Nazis sincerely (and incorrectly) believed that Germany lost the Great War (after taking Russia out of the conflict) only because it was “stabbed in the back” by the Jews and other “internal enemies of Germany”.

Namely, by revolutionary socialists who fomented strikes and labor unrest (in that they were right), and “November Criminals” who had overthrown the German monarchy in the November Revolution of 1918.

Consequently – they reasoned – in order to win the inevitable existential war with the Bolshevist Soviet Union, it will be absolutely (existentially) vital to cleanse the German sphere of control (direct and indirect) of the Jews.

Using whatever means appropriate. Initially, forced emigration was utilized; then (when it became impossible after the outbreak of Second Great War) deportations were considered (to Nisko, Madagascar, and finally to Siberia) … and when none of these was deemed realistic (correctly), Hitler et al decided just to kill them all.

In reality, German Jews were more patriotic than gentiles – which was proven by the German Army. in October 1916, in the middle of the war, it ordered a Jewish census of the troops, with the intent to show that Jews were under-represented in the trenches, and that they were over-represented in non-fighting positions.

Instead, the census showed just the opposite, that Jews were over-represented both in the army as a whole and in fighting positions at the front. The Imperial German Army then (surprise, surprise) suppressed the results of the census.

In reality, Germany lost the war because of its colossal blunders – mostly unrestricted submarine warfare and especially the idiotic Zimmerman telegram – that brought the USA (with their colossal natural, industrial and other resources) into the war on the side of the Allies. Which gave them a decisive advantage.

This decisive event was (negatively) reinforced by failure of a 1918 German Spring Offensive (all-or-nothing gamble). Launched in late March it made impressive gains before running out of steam in June (when fresh American troops arrived).

But they key reason for losing the war was hubris of German High Command. Instead of negotiating acceptable peace terms after winning the war on the eastern front, they went for decisive victory… and lost. There was no stab in the back – just hubris. They gambled – and lost – and that was all.


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