Hitler Got Real Power with Reichstag Fire Decree

Contrary to almost universal misconception, in Weimar republic little has changed after Adolf Hitler was appointed Chancellor of Germany – hence few were alarmed (most of the Jews were not).

True, Adolf Hitler was both willing and capable of solving existential problems that Germany faced: get itself out of Great Depression; radically reduce unemployment, achieve fast economic growth, protect itself from the existential threat of Bolshevism – and return territories taken away by Versailles criminals.

It was also true that he was willing and capable of transforming Weimar republic into a totalitarian Nazi dictatorship (and of making Germany Judenrein – at all costs). However, in Weimar republic he simply did not have enough power to accomplish any of the Reichstag Fire Decree – or even to start the ball rolling.

In January 1933, NSDAP had just 196 seats out of 594 in Reichstag (33.6%) and only three out of thirteen members of German government were NSDAP. Hence, just about everyone (incorrectly) believed that Hitler’s was just another caretaker government that will last only until the next national elections scheduled on March 5, 1933. After the elections, he will be gone – most likely, never to return.

It was not to be. Hitler got this power exactly one month after he became Chancellor – on February 28, 1933 when the (in)famous Reichstag Fire Decree was issued by German President Paul von Hindenburg.

Officially the Decree of the Reich President for the Protection of People and State, nullified many of the key civil liberties of German citizens. With the Nazis in powerful positions in the German government (G;ring was President of Reichstag and Prussian Minister of Interior and Frick had the same position for the whole Germany), the decree was used as the legal basis for the imprisonment of anyone considered to be opponents of the Nazis, and to suppress publications not considered “friendly” to the Nazi cause.

Hence, the Reichstag Fire Decree is rightfully considered by historians as one of the key steps in transformation of Weimar republic into National-Socialist dictatorship (which was completed in August of 1934 when Hitler became F;hrer).And, of course, one of the key steps on the Road to Holocaust – and a heavy slab in the “stack of slabs” that triggered the “Holocaust Avalanche” that killed four million Jews.

Goering used his power as Prussian Minister of Interior to arrest and detain dozens of Communists within hours of Reichstag Fire. His actions were not exactly legal, so he immediately started looking ways to make them legal.

Ludwig Grauert, the chief of the Prussian state police, proposed an emergency presidential decree under Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution, which gave the president the power to take any measure necessary to protect public safety without the consent of the Reichstag (in reality, Weimar republic was not exactly a democracy – it was closer to authoritarian state).

The decree would have suspended most civil liberties under the pretense of preventing further Communist violence. Justice Minister Franz G;rtner, a member of the Nazis’ coalition partner, the German National People’s Party (DNVP), had actually brought a draft decree before the cabinet on the afternoon of 27 February – right before the fire.

After the Fire Decree was issued, the police – now controlled by Hitler’s Nazi Party – made mass arrests of communists, including all of the communist Reichstag delegates. This severely crippled communist participation in the March elections. After the elections, the absence of the communists allowed NSDAP to expand their plurality in the Reichstag, greatly assisting the Nazi seizure of power in Germany.

When the proposed decree was brought before the Reich Cabinet, Interior Minister Wilhelm Frick, the only Nazi in the cabinet who had a portfolio, added a clause that would allow the cabinet to take over the state governments if they failed to maintain order – a key step to establishing a totalitarian state.

Notably, the cabinet would have been allowed to do this on its own authority (without Reichstag consent). Frick was well aware that the Interior portfolio had been given to the Nazis because it was almost powerless; unlike his counterparts in the rest of Europe, he had no power over the police. He saw a chance to extend his power over the states and thus begin the process of Nazifying the country.

At an emergency cabinet meeting, Hitler declared that the fire now made it a matter of “ruthless confrontation of the KPD”—a confrontation that could not be “made dependent on judicial considerations.” Though Vice Chancellor Franz von Papen objected to the clause giving the Reich cabinet the power to take over the state governments if necessary, the decree was approved. Shortly thereafter, President von Hindenburg signed the decree into law.[3]

The decree was short – it consisted of just six articles. Article 1 indefinitely suspended most civil liberties guaranteed by Weimar Constitution, including habeas corpus, inviolability of residence, secrecy of the post and telephone, freedom of expression and of the press, the right to public assembly, and the right of free association, as well as the protection of property and the home.

Articles 2 and 3 allowed the Reich government to assume powers normally reserved for the federal states. Articles 4 and 5 established draconian penalties for certain offenses, including the death penalty for arson to public buildings. Article 6 simply stated that the decree took effect on the day of its proclamation.

The decree was not accompanied by any written guidelines from the Reich government; this omission gave wide latitude in interpreting the decree to Nazis like G;ring, who as Prussian interior minister was the commander of the largest police force in Germany.

The L;nder (German states) not yet in the Nazis’ grasp largely restricted themselves to banning the Communist press, Communist meetings and demonstrations, and detaining leading KPD officials.

In Prussia, however, summary arrests of KPD leaders were common, thousands were imprisoned in the days following the fire, and the total number of arrests in Prussia on the basis of the Reichstag Fire Decree in the two weeks following 28 February is believed to be in the vicinity of 10,000.

G;ring had actually employed such tactics even before the decree, only to have them thrown out by the courts – a check that no longer had any effect with the decree in place.

Within two weeks of the Reichstag Fire Decree taking effect, Reich Commissars were sent out to take over the other states; the heavy-handed repression that was occurring in Prussia quickly spread to the rest of the Reich.

Despite the virulent rhetoric directed against the Communists, the Nazis did not formally ban the KPD right away. Not only did they fear a violent uprising, but they hoped the KPD’s presence on the ballot would siphon off votes from the Social Democratic Party (SPD).

However, while the KPD managed to win 81 seats, it was an open secret that the KPD deputies would never be allowed to take their seats; they were thrown in jail as quickly as the police could track them down. Increasingly, the courts treated KPD membership as an act of treason. Thus, for all intents and purposes, the KPD was banned as of 6 March, the day after the election.

The first report of the fire came shortly after 9:00 p.m. on February 27, when a Berlin fire station received an alarm call. By the time police and firefighters arrived, the structure was engulfed in flames. The police conducted a thorough search inside the building and found Marinus Van der Lubbe, who was arrested.

Both Nazis and their enemies immediately used the fire for their political purposes. Nazis claimed that Communists were behind the fire (which made sense because van der Lubbe was a Dutch communist); their enemies claimed that the Nazis did it.

Neither was true – the independent impartial investigation by Berlin police and fire department proved beyond the reasonable doubt that Van der Lubbe acted alone (he was clinically insane pyromaniac with long history of arsons).

However, given the critical role of Reichstag Fire in establishing National-Socialist dictatorship in Germany (for starters, it saved Hitler from political oblivion), it is highly likely that Van der Lubbe was skillfully manipulated by hypnotists (most likely, associated by then-defunct Thule Society) to achieve exactly what was achieved as the result of the fire.

President Hindenburg hated Communists; van der Lubbe was a Communist; he was guilty beyond the reasonable doubt of setting Reichstag on fire… so Hindenburg needed no convincing to believe that the Communists were behind it all and the only way to save Germany from being destroyed by them was to give Hitler and NSDAP emergency powers. Which he did – with Reichstag Fire Decree.

German courts, however, were not convinced – as there were no evidence that KPD (German Communist Party) had anything to do with the fire. Neither had the defendants in the famous Leipzig Trial (although it was held mostly in Berlin).

On 9 March 1933 the Prussian state police arrested Bulgarians Georgi Dimitrov, Vasil Tanev, and Blagoy Popov, who were known Comintern operatives (though the police did not know it then, Dimitrov was head of all Comintern operations in Western Europe). Ernst Torgler, head of the Communist Party, had surrendered to police on 28 February.

Van der Lubbe and the four communists were the defendants in a trial that started in September 1933. It ended in the acquittal of the four communists and the conviction of Van der Lubbe, who was then guillotined.