Consciousness outside the brain

Ivanov E.M. Consciousness outside the brain // Philosophical Thought. 2025. No. 7. P. 16-38. DOI: 10.25136/2409-8728.2025.7.75197 EDN: ASBTZT URL: https://nbpublish.com/library_read_article.php?id=75197

Abstract: The article examines the "Berkeleyan" approach to solving the psychophysical problem, according to which the only true reality is consciousness, and the entire perceived world, including the body and brain, exists only as subjective images within it. The author proposes a modified version of Berkeleyanism that avoids solipsism by introducing a transindividual sphere of consciousness—shared by all subjects and providing coherence to perception. Berkeley's main argument is the impossibility of conceiving of objects that transcend consciousness, as their concept makes no sense without corresponding experience. However, his concept is criticized for inconsistency: by denying material reality, he retains the transcendence of God and other consciousnesses. Sensory experience is recognized as private, while the intelligible (meaningful) component possesses an intersubjective status. In this model, the "generator of reality" is located within consciousness, creating correlated private worlds, which explains the collective illusion of an objective world. The study is based on an analysis of philosophical and neurophysiological research showing the inadequacy of the naturalistic approach to solving the psychophysical problem. Theories such as the dual-aspect approach, intuitionism, functionalism, and the informational approach are considered. Empirical results from "split-brain" studies, out-of-body experiences, and near-death experiences are utilized. The novelty of the work lies in the rejection of the materialist theories that assert consciousness is derived from the brain. The brain is viewed not as its source, but as an element of "daydreaming," necessary for maintaining the principle of causal closure of physical laws. This explains why brain damage affects consciousness: its function is to provide the appearance of causality in the perceived world. Arguments against naturalism are presented, including the inexplicability of qualia, the integrity, and individuality of consciousness from the perspectives of physics and neurophysiology. Alternative theories (dual-aspect approach, intuitionism, functionalism) are criticized for their inability to solve these problems. Evidence for "consciousness beyond the brain" is provided by phenomena related to out-of-body experiences and near-death experiences. The conclusion is drawn that Berkeleyan ontology offers a coherent solution to the “hard problem of consciousness” (according to D. Chalmers), avoiding the dead ends of materialism and dualism. It aligns with scientific data, explains paranormal phenomena, and opens new avenues for exploring the nature of consciousness.


Keywords:
consciousness, Berkeleianism, mind-body problem, qualia, The Self, idealism, neural correlates of consciousness, out of body experience, near-death experiences, integrity


In this article we will consider in more detail the arguments in favor of the "Berkeleian" approach to solving the psychophysical problem, which we previously briefly described in the article [9] . Let us recall the main provisions of this approach. According to J. Berkeley [4], the only true reality is the consciousness (soul) of specific subjects, and everything else: the "external world" perceived by the subject, including the human body and brain, is nothing more than subjective images (as well as intellectual concepts) existing exclusively within consciousness and having no "objective" existence outside of consciousness. The source ("generator") of images in individual consciousness is, according to Berkeley, a special subject - God, in whose consciousness initially (in Eternity) all possible objects of perception reside - again in the form of images or intellectual concepts.

Berkeley's main argument in favor of his concept of "immaterialism" (the non-existence of objective reality) is that objects external to consciousness (matter) are unthinkable due to their transcendence to consciousness. Here he relied on the theory of knowledge of J. Locke, who claimed that the meaning of any concept stems from one or another fragment of subjective experience to which this concept points as its "denotate". If such experience is absent, then the concept simply has no meaning, is a kind of "nonsense". It follows from this that the concept of any object transcendent to consciousness, since this object, by definition, is not some element of experience, has no meaning. Consequently, we do not think of it - the idea of a transcendental object is either nonsense, or we think of something else in it, immanent to consciousness. But in this case, there is no reason to admit the possibility of the existence of something beyond consciousness.

Let us note that even if we allowed for the possibility of the existence of the transcendent, this idea of a transcendental object of knowledge would still be highly questionable, since it could not be confirmed by any experience. If we understand consciousness “classically” - as the total experience of the subject, his “inner world”, subjective reality, then it is obvious that the subject cannot reliably know anything beyond his own consciousness and, therefore, if we want to build philosophy on the solid ground of experience, and not on any speculation, we must also discard the “transcendental object” as some kind of fantasy unconfirmed by any experience.

However, Berkeley can be reproached for inconsistency, since, excluding the transcendent as "matter", he nevertheless preserves the transcendent as God (as an external "reality generator"), and also preserves the transcendence of "other spirits" - individual consciousnesses of other subjects. Consistent implementation of the principle of immanence of any being to the consciousness of the subject requires placing God and other subjects "inside" the consciousness of a specific subject. God (as a source of images), the surrounding world, other subjects - exist in me as my subjective sensory images or as my intelligible ideas. This point of view is usually rejected as the position of "solipsism" - only I really exist, and all other subjects are only images in my consciousness, like characters in dreams. However, solipsism can be avoided if we allow for one or another form of openness of consciousnesses, i.e. admit that consciousness is not a completely private sphere of personal experience closed in on itself, but, on the contrary, it has a certain component of experience that is common to all consciousnesses – possessing a supra-individual status.

Consciousness has two ontologically different spheres of subjective experience: sensory and intelligible (semantic) [10] . It is quite obvious that sensory experience is private and does not have a supra-individual status. This is indicated, in particular, by the differences in the sensory perception of the surrounding world by different subjects, which were already pointed out by the ancient skeptics. An example of such differences is the phenomenon of color blindness - about 8 percent of the population have color vision that differs significantly from the standard (the remaining 92 percent). There are 7 types of color blindness and one of these types is achromatopsia - a complete lack of color discrimination (only dark and light are distinguished). Since different people perceive the surrounding world differently, we cannot interpret sensory perception in the spirit of intuitionism [3] - as a direct grasp by the subject of a supra-individual objective reality external to consciousness.

In addition, the theory of "direct perception of reality" contradicts the physical picture of the world and the physiology of perception, since this theory ascribes sensory qualities (such as color, taste, smell, heat, cold, etc.) to things themselves as their own objective properties, whereas from the point of view of physics and the physiology of perception, sensory qualities are only conditional subjective "symbols" denoting purely quantitative characteristics of objects of the physical world (color is a designation of the ratio of the lengths of electromagnetic waves reflected by a colored object, smell and taste correspond to the shapes of molecules that affect the olfactory and taste receptors, etc.). If the sensory world that we see is purely private (everyone sees their own "sensory picture"), then only the intelligible (semantic) component of our experience can have a supra-individual status. It is precisely in it that we can place the hypothetical “Berkeleian” “reality generator”, which, possessing a supra-individual status and working in parallel in all individual consciousnesses, produces correlated private “sensory worlds”, thus creating a collective illusion of the existence of a “sensory world” common to all subjects.

Since this supra-individual sphere of consciousness is intelligible, it must be at least potentially knowable and as part of consciousness must somehow be directly experienced by the subject. In our opinion, this kind of experience of the supra-individual is nothing other than the experience of meaning. Meaning is the substantive assignment of what is being comprehended to a system of contexts, each of which also has meaning and, therefore, is related to some other contexts that also have meaning, etc. This entire essentially infinite system of contexts embedded in one another, taken together, forms an integral semantic picture of the world (or more precisely, a picture of a “multitude of possible worlds,” since meaning also includes the “as if” mode), the correlation of the actual sensory experience with which generates the meaning of this experience. Thus, the very fact of the existence of meaning indicates that in the general supra-individual part of consciousness there must be something similar to Plato's "world of ideas", or similar to Plotinus's "World Mind", or Leibniz's "set of all possible worlds". Thinking in this case can be interpreted, according to Plato, as a process of direct contemplation of supra-individual ideas, which ensures not only the overcoming of solipsism, due to the possibility of communication of subjects through the common "world of ideas" for all, but also allows us to explain the existence of universal, necessary and generally significant truths in mathematics. The work of the "reality generator" can then be imagined as a multitude of parallel, correlated with each other, but at the same time strictly individualized processes of sequential in time "projection" (unfolding) of this supra-individual "world of ideas" into the private sensory sphere of consciousness of specific empirical subjects. Each individual consciousness in this case consists of a private sensory sphere (a picture of “reality sensually perceived by the subject”), a supra-individual supersensory semantic sphere (“the world of ideas”) and, also, a private, individualized (specific for each subject) process of “projecting” semantic contents (“ideas”) into private sensuality.

Since the "reality generator" common to all subjects, from our point of view, is located inside each consciousness, in its "supra-individual" component, we, in principle, should also have access to knowledge of the algorithms of this "generator", i.e. we should have universal omniscience - knowledge of the past, present, future, as well as all possible alternative versions of the past, present and future. However, as we will see below, the binding of our individual consciousness to a specific physical body (through assuming the function of controlling the movements of this body) leads to the fact that our access to this universal information "about everything" must necessarily be significantly limited.

The existence of such phenomena as dreams and hallucinations directly demonstrates the ability of consciousness to independently (without the influence of any external "objective reality") generate private sensory worlds. It seems extremely unlikely that the mechanism for generating dreams and hallucinatory images can differ radically from the mechanism of ordinary sensory perception - since dream images and hallucinations can be extremely realistic and essentially no different from the ordinary sensory images we see. It is natural to assume that in both cases the same "reality generator" operates, located inside consciousness (in its supra-individual part), but operates in different modes. In sleep and when experiencing hallucinations, the mode of producing private images in the sensory consciousness of a specific subject operates, without coordination with the perception of other subjects. The "awake" mode of operation, on the contrary, presupposes mutual coordination of the sensory experiences of various subjects (the "intersubjectivity" of the perceived picture of the world).

In this case, the "Berkeleian" ontology can be clearly described using the metaphor of sleep. The sensory world that we see in the waking state, including our own body, can be considered the content of a kind of "day dream", which differs from "night" dreams only in its greater clarity, the sequence of experienced events, the fullness of our self-awareness, and the consistency of the "dreams" of different subjects (so that a common "dream" is created for everyone, in which each subject acts as a separate character in this "dream"). Also, in this "day dream", unlike night sleep, all the physical laws of nature known to us are strictly observed, which, as we will see later, explains the empirical dependence of consciousness on the body and brain.

From this point of view, our body, brain, internal organs, as well as other objects surrounding us in this “daytime sleep,” are only sensory images that our own consciousness generates. Generates them in the same way that it undoubtedly does in a “nighttime” sleep, when we perceive in a dream a certain “world surrounding us” and our own “dream body” within this world. In this case, it is clear that the brain, within the framework of “Berkeleian” ontology, cannot be considered as a “producer” of phenomenal consciousness, since it itself is a product of this consciousness.

Any dynamics of images in “daytime” or “nighttime” dreams, obviously, should also be produced by consciousness itself – it would be strange to assume that our own “dream body” perceived by us in a dream moves, speaks, and carries out intelligent actions precisely because of its specific complex internal structure – the presence of muscles, bones, internal organs, and a complexly structured brain that controls behavior. Examining our body in a nighttime dream, we could hypothetically discover that it is empty inside or filled with some homogeneous substance – and this probably would not prevent us from moving and speaking intelligently in this dream. Similarly, “in reality,” in a “daytime dream,” the actions of our “daytime dream body” should also be controlled directly by consciousness itself, and not by the brain, muscles, nerves, or other “stuffing” of our body. Then the question inevitably arises: why is all this “stuffing” of the body – muscles, bones, nerves, brain and other organs needed at all, and why do injuries to the body and especially the brain significantly affect our behavior and mental functions, up to and including complete loss of consciousness with significant brain damage or when exposed to anesthesia?

This question was already asked by J. Berkeley [4 p. 60] and he also suggested the answer to it. He wrote: “… although the structure of all these parts and organs (of our body - E.I.) is not absolutely necessary for the production of any action, but it is necessary for the production of things in a constant and correct way, according to the laws of nature” [4, p. 62] . Indeed, our waking “day dream”, as already noted, differs fundamentally from the “night” dream in that physical laws are strictly observed in it - the laws of conservation (energy, momentum, angular momentum), as well as the laws of motion described by dynamic equations. From these dynamic equations and conservation laws follows the principle of causal closure of physical reality: the cause of any physical events in our perceived Universe (including any movements of our body) are always some other physical events within this same Universe. Consequently, any physical events of the “day dream” (reality) should look as if they had causes in the form of other events of this “day dream”. It follows from this that any movements of our body (including speech, verbal reflexive self-report) in this “day dream” of ours should look as if they have physical causes - namely, they should be explained by the structure and nature of the functioning of our body and brain, perceived in this “day dream”.

So, let us imagine a dream in which the principle of causal closure is strictly observed with respect to any events of the dream (that is, in other words, all the laws of nature known to us are observed). In such a case, for any event in this dream we must necessarily find a purely physical, material explanation. We must necessarily find the same causal physical explanation for any rational physical actions of our body. But such a causal explanation of the actions of the body can only be the complex structure of our body and brain, as well as their adequate (from the point of view of the possibility of explaining behavior) functioning. Thus, although we know in advance (since we are talking about a dream) that all events of the dream are produced directly by consciousness, and the brain and dream body are only passive images of this dream, the study of this “dream body” and “dream brain” that we conducted in the dream must necessarily lead us to the conclusion that the rational actions of our body are explained exclusively by the physical structure and function of this body itself and, in particular, are explained by the complex structure of our brain.

In fact, since all events of a dream are produced directly by consciousness, neither the brain nor the structure of the body make any real contribution to our behavior, they are completely useless, they only imitate the presence of “material” causes of the body’s actions, but, nevertheless, they are absolutely necessary for the principle of causal closure of this “dream world” of ours to be strictly fulfilled.

From the point of view of the “Berkeleian” ontology, the “real world” that we see is a kind of “realistic” “day dream” on which the condition of strict fulfillment of the principle of causal closure is imposed, which means that in this dream the illusion is necessarily maintained that the cause of my complex behavior is the equally complex work of my brain.

It is clear that in order for this illusion of dependence of our behavior on the function of the brain to be strictly maintained, the function of consciousness associated with the control of our body must be strictly coordinated with the processes occurring in our brain. If I see a certain object and somehow behaviorally react to it (for example, I see a ball and catch it), then the brain must necessarily have a sensory display of this object (in the form of a neural code) and then the corresponding processes of information processing must be carried out in it, leading to the initiation and implementation of this behavioral act. Otherwise, this action of mine in response to the perceived object will not have physical causes and the principle of causal closure will be violated. This means that my “sensory perception” (and in fact the generation by consciousness of a sensory “picture” of the surrounding world) must strictly correspond to the sensory information from the sense organs that my brain receives, and also any of my motor acts (in fact, performed directly by consciousness) must strictly correspond to the commands that the brain gives to the muscles, taking into account the sensory information processed by it. All this creates the appearance of dependence of consciousness on the brain and creates for us the illusion that “the brain produces consciousness.”

The question then arises: if the “Berkeleian” model of “consciousness outside the brain” leads us, at the level of empirical experience, to the same conclusions about the necessary connection between the brain and consciousness as ordinary naturalistic theories based on the formula “the brain generates consciousness,” then what can be seen as the advantage of the “Berkeleian” ontology, what does it give us in terms of a productive solution to the psychophysical problem?

The need to turn to such seemingly extravagant theories as Berkeley's ontology, in our opinion, is due to the fact that the naturalistic concept of the "derivation of consciousness from the brain" is capable of solving only the "easy problem of consciousness" (according to D. Chalmers [19] ), i.e. the problem of explaining the function of consciousness, its participation in the regulation of behavior, the determination of the actions of our body, which of course can be explained from the position of naturalism as a product of the brain's work, but it is not capable of solving the "hard problem of consciousness" - the problem of the existence of "subjective reality", the phenomenal inner world of the subject, and it is also not capable of explaining the obvious properties of this inner world, in particular, the existence of such subjective phenomena as sensory qualities (qualia), a special form of integrity of consciousness, as well as the presence of individuality (belonging of consciousness to a specific I) [11] .

The very existence of phenomenal consciousness from the point of view of the naturalistic paradigm is not only inexplicable, but also superfluous. If mental functions are produced exclusively by the work of the brain, then it is unclear why this work of the brain should be accompanied by any subjective experiences at all, which from this point of view do not make any real contribution to mental processes. Phenomenal consciousness turns into an epiphenomenon, passively accompanying physiological processes in the brain. But then the question arises: how can we know about the existence of phenomenal consciousness if it is completely passive, incapable of acting on its own, and our self-report is produced only by the work of the brain, which does not depend on the presence or absence of subjective experiences. We could be “philosophical zombies” [19] and not even suspect it. In the “Berkeleian” model, it is consciousness that acts, it gives birth to the brain, the body, and the entire world, and, moreover, without it nothing exists at all. Here, therefore, “philosophical zombies” are not possible, and thus the problem of “mental causality”, which is insoluble from the standpoint of naturalism, is removed – the problem of the ability of phenomenal consciousness to be the true cause of mental and behavioral events, as well as its ability to report on itself in a self-report.

From the point of view of the "Berkeleian" model, the brain is only a "reflex machine", by appealing to the work of which we can explain only the physical actions of our body without violating the principle of causal closure of the world we perceive. But the brain has nothing to do with the production of phenomenal consciousness, and therefore it is useless to look for an explanation in it of that in consciousness that is not reduced to the mechanisms of ensuring the physical movements of the body. To ensure this or that behavior, only the presence of information about the external world in the brain is important, but it does not matter in what form this information is presented. Therefore, we necessarily find in the brain neural correlates of our sensory picture of the world (in the corresponding projection areas of the cerebral cortex), but we do not find in the brain anything that would explain the subjective form in which this picture of the world is presented in our phenomenal consciousness. In particular, we find no explanation for either the sensory qualities (qualia), or the specific form of integrity of phenomenal consciousness (its “gestalt” properties), or the individuality of our Self. In another work [11] we have already substantiated the impossibility of a naturalistic explanation of these three “formal” properties of phenomenal consciousness. In this article, it makes sense to return to these “anti-naturalistic” arguments, since there is an opportunity to further develop and strengthen them.

Let us begin with the problem of the nature of sensory qualities (qualia) - such as color, smell, taste, sensations of heat and cold, etc. Let us first note that the very fact of the existence of, for example, visual images is extremely difficult to interpret from the standpoint of a naturalistic theory that asserts the derivative nature of phenomenal consciousness from the work of the brain. If the brain directly generates visual images, then they must exist inside it. However, when we open the skull or scan the brain, we do not find visual images there (for example, a room that the subject sees).

The existence of sensory qualities is in even greater contradiction with the naturalistic solution of the psychophysical problem - since sensory qualities are completely absent from the physical picture of the world. According to this picture, all objects surrounding us, as well as our body and brain, all of them consist of the same elementary particles (proton, neutron and electron), united into atoms and molecules. But elementary particles, atoms, molecules, from a physical point of view, are in themselves devoid of any sensory qualities (they have neither color, nor smell, nor taste, etc.) and have only quantitative characteristics. This means that macro-objects composed of them should not have qualities either. Qualities, according to the physiology and psychology of sensory perception, are only conventional designations in our sensory consciousness of "objectively existing" quantitative characteristics of physical objects (color "encodes" the length of the light wave reflected by an object, taste and smell reflect the geometric shape of molecules, etc.). But if there are no qualities in external objects, nor in our brain (since it consists of the same qualityless atoms as the objects around us), then how do these qualities, which do not exist in nature, appear in our sensory perception?

Two approaches to solving the problem of qualities have been proposed, and both, in our opinion, are quite unsuccessful. The first approach is associated with a “two-aspect” solution to the psychophysical problem (proposed in its classical form by G. T. Fechner [21] ), according to which the mental and the physical are related as “internal” (how the object exists “in itself”) and “external” (how it is perceived “from the outside” by another subject). Further, it is necessary to add to this solution the “theory of hieroglyphs” of G. Helmholtz, according to which the image and the object have only an abstract similarity according to the type of mathematical relation of isomorphism or homomorphism (which assumes a one-to-one relationship between the elements of two sets, also ordered by corresponding relations, with a possible difference both in the elements of these sets and in the nature of the relations between them in each set), but do not have, at the same time, any visual similarity (just as Chinese hieroglyphs do not resemble the objects they designate). That is why we do not see a room in our head when this room is actually perceived by us sensually. We do not see a room in our head not because it is not there, but because we systematically see something that is not really there - instead of a room that really exists in our head, we see the brain - which in reality does not exist, it is like a kind of "hieroglyph" depicting this real "room in the head" in our perception.
The absence of qualities in the physical picture of the world, from this point of view, can be explained, as B. Russell did [17] , by the fact that the qualities “in things” and the “qualities in the brain” that encode them do not coincide (for example, a specific color can be encoded by a geometric shape, another color or taste, etc.), therefore, in the scientific picture of the world, these qualities are simply eliminated and replaced by abstract quantitative relationships.

The main drawback of this approach is that it assumes the incompleteness of the existing physical picture of the world, concerning ordinary atomic-molecular matter. Where this physical picture sees only quantitative characteristics (in modern physics, particles are described simply as sets of numbers - these are quantum numbers, mass, charge, characteristics of the state of motion - energy, momentum, etc.), there, from this point of view, some sensory qualities are hidden - color, smell, taste, etc. If in the times of Fechner and Russell such an idea could still seem plausible, then in our time, physicists are quite sure that quantum theory and modern physics of elementary particles give us an exhaustive description of the properties of ordinary atomic-molecular matter and, thus, there is no way to somehow plausibly "build in" any other qualities into this description. The well-known von Neumann theorem on the impossibility of introducing hidden parameters into quantum mechanics [14] essentially blocks the possibility of finding any more fundamental physical description of elementary particles and atoms than the one given to us by quantum theory. Therefore, as it seems to us, there is not only no need to reinterpret physics by introducing qualities into it (which would make a mathematical, purely quantitative description of physical objects impossible), but there is not even any real possibility of such a reinterpretation.

Another possible approach to solving the problem of the nature of sensory qualities is offered by the “intuitionist” theory of knowledge, proposed at the end of the 19th century by A. Bergson [3] , and, in fact, somewhat earlier, in a different form, by E. Mach. This approach can be characterized as a radical form of “direct realism,” which denies the representative nature of perception. What we see around us, from this point of view, is not a “picture” existing in individual consciousness, but the real world itself, existing independently of us, and we perceive it exactly as it exists in itself. This means that things, from the point of view of this theory, are exactly as we directly perceive them — and they themselves possess those sensory qualities that we discern in them. Perception only “grasps” reality external to the subject, and does not create some kind of “subjective model” of this genuine reality. And there is no “doubling” of reality in the form of images and “the objects themselves.” The objects of science (atoms, quantum fields, particles, etc.), as E. Mach already asserted, from this point of view, exist only in the imagination of scientists and serve only as a tool for the “compact” description (interpretation) of sensory experience - identical to reality itself.

But if scientific objects are only a subjective "superstructure" over sensory experience, existing only in the minds of scientists and having no relation to the true reality (which is exactly as we see it), then consciousness, as one of the scientific constructs, is also (if we are consistent) something that exists only in the heads of scientists and philosophers who invented this concept. In fact, no consciousness exists as a sphere of subjective private experience. Thus, by consistently developing this type of theory of knowledge, we come to the elimination of consciousness itself and, therefore, remove the very problem of the relationship between consciousness and the brain.

However, as already noted, there are indisputable facts indicating the private nature of sensory experience (for example, the fact of the existence of various forms of color blindness), which excludes the possibility of interpreting sensory perception as a "direct vision of reality." In addition, such an approach is incompatible with the data of the physiology and psychology of perception, which clearly indicate the subjective, private nature of the sensory picture of the world that we experience. Thus, intuitionism also does not solve the problem of the nature of sensory qualities.

The so-called “functional” approach to solving the psychophysical problem also does not provide an answer to the question of the origin of sensory qualities, which assumes that phenomenal consciousness is a “brain function in its pure form”, considered independently of its substrate (physical) basis, and not an internal aspect of the physical state of the brain. However, there is an obvious gap in the explanation here, since it is not explained in any way how the brain function (reduced to electrochemical processes in neurons) can correspond to the experienced sensory phenomenal picture of the world, which has sensory qualities. The “informational” approach [6] is also untenable , identifying the phenomenal inner world (subjective reality) with “pure information” contained in the brain. Note that sensory qualities are not information about the external world, but a subjective form of representation of this information in consciousness. Information itself, for example, about the length of a light wave, could be encoded in consciousness not by color, but, say, by different shading of objects. That is, information is content-invariant to the method of its presentation. Thus, from the very concept of information, the necessity of the existence of any sensory qualities does not logically follow, and therefore the identification of phenomenal consciousness with information has, from our point of view, no real basis.

The "Berkeleian" ontology gives us a completely acceptable solution to the problem of the nature of qualities. From this point of view, it is not the brain that produces private phenomenal sensory consciousness, but on the contrary, it is consciousness that "generates" both our brain and our body as elements of the sensory picture of the world, just as it generates our "dream body" in a dream. We cannot explain sensory images and qualities as a product of the brain's work simply because the brain is not a generator of phenomenal consciousness, does not produce images, does not produce qualities. The illusion of the dependence of consciousness on the brain stems from the requirement to observe the principle of causal closure of the world we see - any events in it must appear as consequences of other events in the same world, which means that the rational actions of our body must appear as a product of the work of our brain and other organs inside the body. But the work of the brain must necessarily explain only the movements of the body as physical events, which means there is no need to ascribe to the brain any role in the production of those subjective phenomena that have no direct relation to these movements of the body. In order for intelligent body movements to appear as a product of the brain, it is necessary and sufficient that the brain contain sensory information exactly the same as that currently contained in the consciousness that actually controls the body movements, and that the necessary physiological neural processes exist that link this information with the initiation of intelligent action. At the same time, there is no need for this sensory information in the brain to be presented in the same sensory form in which it is presented in phenomenal consciousness. In particular, there is no need to represent this information by means of the sensory qualities known to us. It is only important that it, this information, initiates the necessary intelligent movement. Therefore, we do not find any sensory qualities in the brain or even any possible physiological correlates of these qualities. In all sensory modalities (vision, hearing, touch, smell, taste, etc.), we find in the brain processes of generation and transmission of action potentials from one neural structure to another that are uniform in their physical and physiological nature. There is no special anatomical, physiological or physical specificity of the visual, auditory, olfactory, tactile or gustatory cortex of the brain that could explain why a standard nerve impulse in the visual cortex produces a visual sensation, while exactly the same impulse addressed to the auditory cortex produces a sensation of sound. The qualities in the nervous system, figuratively speaking, are coded only by the “channel number” through which this or that information is transmitted, and not by any physical, physiological or even functional properties of these channels. But this is precisely the state of affairs that the concept of “consciousness outside the brain” that we are considering predicts.

Thus, we state that the very fact of the existence of sensory modality-specific qualities is inexplicable either from the point of view of physics or from the point of view of the physiology of the brain. However, we are able to give a verbal report on the presence in our experience of sensory qualities, which, as we have seen, cannot be either a product of the brain's work or any of its "internal" properties, and, consequently, the brain itself cannot report anything about these qualities. Isn't the principle of causal closure of the world we see violated here - after all, it turns out that our verbal self-report can contain information (about the fact of the existence of qualities) that cannot be caused by any physical events in the brain or in the world around us? From our point of view, the principle of causal closure is not violated here, although in this case there are clearly non-physical causes of physical events (qualities as causes of reports of the existence of qualities). This is possible, in our opinion, due to the fact that at the fundamental level of the quantum-mechanical description of reality, there is not a rigid “Laplace” determinism, but, in many cases, there is only a probabilistic connection between previous and subsequent physical events (described using the evolution of the wave function).

In some cases, quantum uncertainty can be transferred from micro-objects to the level of macro-objects, according to the "Schr;dinger's cat" mechanism, i.e. due to the causal dependence of macro-level events on micro-level events. Thus, we can admit (for example, from the position of the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics) the existence of macroscopic superpositions (for example, superpositions of states of a macroscopic measuring device), which, in fact, allows us to experimentally observe quantum uncertainty. If we admit the possibility of an expedient influence of the "reality generator" on the acts of wave function reduction (its influence on the choice of a certain outcome of a quantum measurement), and also admit the existence of quantum macroscopic superpositions in the brain, then we can fully explain how the "reality generator", located inside consciousness, can determine, as it were, "on top" of physical causality, certain aspects of our verbal self-report without violating, at the same time, the principle of causal closure and, also, without violating any physical laws of nature. This is possible precisely because of the probabilistic nature of physical determinism (only the probability distribution of certain physical events, described by the wave function, evolves rigidly). Any specific outcome of a quantum measurement, if its probability is not equal to zero, and also any, even extremely unlikely, sequence of such outcomes, do not violate the laws of physics (in particular, the laws of conservation, which are strictly fulfilled in each specific measurement), and therefore the principle of causal closure.

The very possibility of our verbal report on the existence of sensory qualities, therefore, suggests that consciousness has some additional "degrees of freedom" that are inexplicable only from the point of view of the determination of the psyche by the work of the brain, but which, however, considered from the position of the "quantum approach", do not entail a violation of the laws of nature. Consciousness reports on the presence of qualities due to the fact that the "reality generator", which certainly knows about the existence of qualities, since it itself produces them, can "modulate" the verbal self-report within the limits of quantum uncertainty, by influencing quantum probabilities, and thus include in it messages about the fact of the existence of qualities. If such additional degrees of freedom did not exist, then it would be impossible to find any arguments in favor of the "Berkeleian" model, which assumes the possibility of some, even a small "gap" between the function of consciousness and the function of the brain. And such arguments exist, as we will see below, in addition to the fact of the existence of physically inexplicable sensory qualities.

This "quantum" approach also allows us to solve the problem of free will. Our model of "consciousness outside the brain" assumes a strict dependence of the function of consciousness on the function of the brain - any of our physical actions, any verbal reports (which are also physical actions) must be fundamentally causally explainable by physical processes in the brain and in our body, otherwise the principle of causal closure of the world we perceive will be violated. The brain and the laws of physics act here as if in the role of an algorithm, according to which the "reality generator" inside our consciousness works, and if this algorithm were absolutely rigid, prescribing strictly defined actions of ours, then free will would be impossible - despite the fact that the real actor here is precisely consciousness, and not the brain or physical laws. (Just as, for example, in a computer, the real "actor" is the computer itself, as a physical device, and the algorithm it implements imposes only certain restrictions on the nature of its functioning). But the quantum, probabilistic nature of physical determinism removes this rigid dependence of our physical actions on the work of the brain and, thus, allows for free will, which, however, can only manifest itself within the framework of what is physically permitted.
So, we have explained how our verbal report on those properties of our consciousness that are inexplicable only by the work and physical structure of the brain is possible. In addition to the presence of sensory qualities, such a physically and physiologically inexplicable property of consciousness is its integrity.

Our perception includes not only individual sensations, but also their interrelations, forming holistic images of objects and scenes. All this is united into a single “perceptual field of consciousness,” where each element is realized in relation to others, allowing us to directly distinguish similarities and differences between them.

If this integrity were created by the brain, then global integration of all sensory streams should occur in it at the level of individual neurons or even their internal structures. However, according to the physical principle of short-range action, information can only correlate with direct interaction. There is no neuron in the brain that is capable of simultaneously processing all sensory streams and creating a holistic picture of the world. Although there are neurons that respond to certain categories of objects, none is capable of encompassing the entire complex "scene" with many elements.

If visual information is distributed among many neurons, how can they combine it into a single image if each one receives only a small part of this information? A neuron can be compared to an individual person: if a group of people see only fragments of the overall picture, their consciousnesses do not merge into a single “superconsciousness”, even if they exchange information. Likewise, neurons cannot create a holistic perception simply because they are connected.

Studies of split-brain patients (as a result of an operation to sever the corpus callosum, which functionally connects the left and right hemispheres of the brain) have shown that the operation results in a disruption of the functional unity of consciousness [24] . For example, these patients are unable to compare objects presented briefly simultaneously to the left and right visual hemifields (projected into different hemispheres). However, more recent studies have shown that the introspective self-reports of split-brain subjects do not at all indicate any splitting of their phenomenal consciousness. The subjects claimed that they subjectively perceive both the left and right visual hemifields simultaneously and, moreover, in a wide range of tasks these patients showed full awareness of the presence and well above chance levels of recognition of the location, orientation, and identity of stimuli across the visual field, regardless of the type of response (left hand, right hand, or verbal) [26] . As a result, the authors of the study came to the conclusion that “…the rupture of cortical connections between the hemispheres separates visual perception, but does not create two independent conscious perceiving subjects in one brain” [26, p. 1231] .

Here we see a paradoxical situation from the point of view of the naturalistic paradigm, when the brain is both anatomically and functionally split, there is no significant exchange of information between the left and right hemispheres (which is confirmed by functional tests), but the integrity of phenomenal consciousness does not suffer. But this is precisely the state of affairs that our concept of "consciousness outside the brain" predicts. Since the brain is not the "generator" of phenomenal consciousness here, it is not the source of the integrity of consciousness. This integrity exists as an original fundamental property of phenomenal consciousness, which cannot be destroyed by a violation of the anatomical and functional integrity of the brain. However, since the principle of causal closure requires the presence of a dependence of the function of consciousness (manifested in physical actions, including self-reporting) on the function of the brain, the functional splitting of the brain imposes significant restrictions on the function of consciousness (consciousness cannot do what the brain cannot do), therefore, being phenomenally unified, consciousness, nevertheless, demonstrates a certain “splitness” at the functional level - it is not capable of performing tasks of comparing perceived objects if such tasks are not capable of being solved by a split brain.

Thus, we can state that the form of integrity of our sensory consciousness that we directly subjectively experience cannot be provided only by the work of the neural networks of our brain, since in these networks sensory information can be represented only in a distributed, partially integrated form. And even the anatomical splitting of the brain into two largely functionally independent structures is not a basis for splitting phenomenal consciousness into two independent spheres of subjective experience. All this directly speaks in favor of the concept of "consciousness outside the brain."

Another mystery of consciousness is its individuality. It belongs to a specific “I” and does not exist impersonally. Why am I exactly me and not someone else? This cannot be explained by material reasons: the atoms and molecules of the body are constantly renewed, but the “I” remains the same. In addition, from the point of view of quantum physics, elementary particles are absolutely identical and do not have individuality, so replacing some atoms with others should not lead to any observable consequences.

The uniqueness of the structure of the body and brain does not explain individuality either. Theoretically, since matter consists of absolutely standard blocks - atoms, it is possible to create an exact copy of any person, for example, me. But this copy will clearly not be "me", since I will not feel its pain or control its actions. My "I" is unique and cannot be reproduced, whereas everything in the physical world consists of standard particles and is therefore fundamentally copyable. Therefore, the individuality of consciousness does not depend on material factors, which means that consciousness itself is not part of physical reality and is not reducible to it.

Thus, we see that consciousness has properties that are completely absent in the physical world, and also cannot be explained by the functions of the brain. These properties are: quality (qualia), a special form of integrity of consciousness, and individuality. This circumstance is inexplicable from the point of view of naturalistic concepts, considering consciousness as something derived from the brain and physical reality. But all these facts are easily explained from the position of our “idealistic” concept of “consciousness outside the brain”.

Consciousness from this point of view is a fundamental reality and there is no need to somehow explain its appearance or its properties based on the work of the brain or by appealing to any properties of physical reality. On the contrary, in this model, both the brain and the world we see are a product of the work of consciousness itself, a product of the work of the “reality generator” located “inside” consciousness, in its supra-individual part. The laws of nature, from this point of view, are the fundamental algorithm of the work of this “reality generator”. Therefore, physical reality is related not to the sensory, directly perceived picture of the world, but to the supersensory supra-individual “layer” of consciousness where the “reality generator” is located. And in this layer, there is no quality, individuality, or form of integrity inherent in individual consciousness – precisely because of its intelligible and supra-individual status [11] .

To the extent that individual consciousness takes on the task of controlling the movements of a particular body, it is subject to limitations associated with the functional capabilities of the brain - it cannot do what the brain cannot do, in particular, it cannot functionally possess information (i.e. have the ability to express it verbally) that the brain does not possess. This explains why we are unable to directly recognize the fact that the world we see is a product of our consciousness. This information is “closed” to us simply because it is absent from the brain. This also explains the existence of the “unconscious” - any information that is absent from the brain or is present in it but in a form inaccessible to verbal reporting must also be functionally inaccessible to our individual consciousness. Since it is consciousness that creates the world around us, it obviously has the potential to have universal and comprehensive knowledge of this world. However, access to this knowledge is largely blocked by the requirement to observe the principle of causal closure - consciousness, due to its connection with the body, can initiate only those actions of this body that the brain is also capable of initiating and, therefore, can consciously possess only the information that is contained in the brain, and in a form accessible for verbal reporting. Access to any other information is blocked, although it is certainly present in consciousness in an "unconscious" (verbally inexpressible) form and is capable, as we will see later, of indirectly influencing our behavior.

It must be acknowledged that the arguments we have presented in favor of the “idealistic” solution to the psychophysical problem can also be used to justify the dualistic approach, according to which the brain actually participates in the implementation of mental functions, but since in the brain (and in the physical world as a whole) we do not find grounds for explaining the facts of the existence of sensory qualities, integrity and individuality of phenomenal consciousness, there is also a certain “extra-somatic” (and “extra-physical”) component of the psyche (“soul”), which provides all these properties of phenomenal consciousness that do not exist in the physical world. We have considered a similar “dualistic” model for solving the psychophysical problem in detail in other publications [8, 11] , so we will not describe it in detail in this paper. We will only note that consistently developed dualism also ultimately turns out to be a certain version of idealism (Platonism) [11] . The concept of "consciousness outside the brain" proposed in this article allows us to present a largely similar version of idealism more consistently, although starting from a different starting point of argumentation. At the same time, these models ("dualism" and "Berkelianism") still differ and, as we will see below, in some cases give different predictions, which allows us to make a reasoned choice between them.

However, the arguments considered above, as it seems to us, clearly exclude the possibility of a naturalistic solution to the psychophysical problem – proceeding from the thesis: “the brain generates phenomenal consciousness.” We do not find anything in the brain that could plausibly explain its ability to “generate” phenomenal consciousness.

Another argument in favor of the concept of "consciousness outside the brain" is the futility of attempts by neurophysiologists to find "neural correlates of consciousness" in the brain. Active searches for such correlates have been going on for over 30 years, since the early 1990s [23] , and they have not yielded any positive results to date [12] . In particular, it has not been possible to link consciousness to any specific anatomical structure inside the brain. Such parts of the brain as the reticular formation, thalamus, enclosure, fusiform neurons in the frontal cortex, insula in the cerebral cortex, etc. have been considered as a possible "brain substrate of consciousness," but it has not been possible to reliably prove the connection between these structures and consciousness. It has also not been possible to link consciousness with various global parameters of neural activity in the brain as a whole. It has only been established that a certain, sufficiently high level of general brain activity and a sufficiently high level of mutual connectivity of various parts of the brain are necessary to maintain consciousness. But this is how it should be from the point of view of “Berkeleian” ontology – since from this point of view the brain is not a “generator” of phenomenal consciousness, and therefore there is no “neural correlate of consciousness”.

It was also not possible to connect consciousness with the content of the information that the brain operates on. Research into such a phenomenon as “post-hypnotic suggestion” showed that it is possible to block awareness of virtually any information using hypnosis, for example, to prohibit the subject from perceiving an object located directly in front of him or to block certain memories, skills, etc. [1, 2] . Moreover, this blocking in this case is effective during the period of time when the subject has already emerged from hypnosis and is in a normal mental state. It follows that the presence or absence of awareness of this or that information by a person does not depend in any way on its content, or on its functional properties, or on the level of integration of various modalities in it, etc. The presence or absence of awareness of this or that content of mental processes is apparently determined only by the formal adoption at some deep level of the psyche of a decision on awareness or non-awareness (blocking of awareness) of this or that information. Some domestic authors studying the problem of consciousness have come to the same conclusion [1, 2] .

This state of affairs is easily explained from the standpoint of the theory of "consciousness outside the brain." Since, from the point of view of this concept, it is consciousness that is the "creator of reality," it must, as already noted, potentially possess absolute completeness of information about this reality - possess "omniscience." However, since consciousness is limited by the requirement (which it has apparently imposed on itself) of generating such a perceived reality that is subject to all known physical laws of nature, and since individual consciousness is bound by the task of controlling the movements of a specific physical body of a person, this potential omniscience is blocked by the need to observe the principle of causal closure of the physical world. We can be aware of and verbally express only that information that is also contained in our brain and, in addition, is accessible to the speech centers of our brain. If this were not so, the principle of causal closure would be violated - since we could then make statements that are in no way causally determined by the physical state of our brain.

Therefore, the only necessary and sufficient condition for awareness of something is, from this point of view, the possibility of access to this information for its "reading" by the speech centers of the brain, responsible for the formation of our statements. If this kind of access to information to the speech centers is blocked for some reason, then the possibility of awareness of this information is also blocked - to eliminate contradictions between the current content of consciousness and the need to comply with the laws of nature.

As noted above, due to the fact that the laws of nature in the person of quantum mechanics in many cases assume the probabilistic nature of the determination of physical events, it becomes possible for consciousness to manifest itself in the physical world to some extent independently of the neurophysiological processes in the brain - by influencing in a certain way the probabilistic processes inside the brain. In this case, no physical laws of nature are violated, and the probabilistic anomalies that appear in this case can be formally attributed to chance. This, in particular, allows consciousness to verbally communicate what is completely absent in the brain, for example, the presence of phenomenal sensory qualities.

It can be assumed that due to this mechanism of the influence of consciousness on random processes, there are other forms of partial “leakage” of information, formally prohibited from the point of view of the principle of causal closure, into our verbal report and our behavioral acts. For example, this can be information about the future. Since the world we see, from the point of view of our theory, is created by consciousness itself, then, apparently, it must have information in advance - what it is going to create further, since otherwise it would be difficult to generate a consistent, self-consistent flow of perceived events for all empirical subjects with private consciousness. “Leakage” of information about the future can occur in sleep - which explains the undoubtedly existing phenomenon of “prophetic dreams” [5] . This finds a completely natural explanation within the framework of our theory, since in sleep the “reality generator” at the level of a specific individual switches to another, private mode of operation and the restriction of the need to fulfill the condition of causal closure is removed from the individual consciousness - in sleep, physical laws may not be fulfilled. But this information about the future can also affect the “daytime” waking consciousness, and then we have cases of premonition of future events [15] . Such phenomena, inexplicable naturalistically, are quite natural from the point of view of the theory of “consciousness outside the brain”.

At the same time, it is clear that such a "leak" of information about the future cannot be too large-scale and such information cannot be absolutely reliable. Otherwise, logical paradoxes could arise. If we could predict, for example, catastrophes with 100% accuracy, then we could effectively prevent these catastrophes, and therefore our predictions would turn out to be false. Therefore, it can be stated a priori that any prophecies should only correspond to real future events with some probability (for example, prophetic dreams do not always come true, any prophets and clairvoyants make mistakes), but, at the same time, the probability of correctly anticipating the future can be significantly higher than the percentage of random guesses.

Within the framework of the concept under consideration, the brain and body impose restrictions on certain abilities of consciousness (consciousness cannot do what the brain is not capable of doing) only to the extent that it is connected with the task of controlling the movements (including verbal reporting) of a particular body. In particular, the sensory picture of the world created by consciousness should normally correspond in content to the sensory information that is currently coming to the brain from the sense organs. Otherwise, the principle of causal closure of the physical world will be violated, since if consciousness perceives what is unknown to the brain, then it will also be able to perform body movements that are not conditioned by the physical state of our brain. From this we can conclude that if consciousness can somehow refuse to perform this function of controlling body movements, then the sensory picture of the world can also lose its connection with this body, i.e. that some “out-of-body” (not associated with the body, with the work of the sense organs) perspective of perceiving the surrounding world is possible. Indeed, the phenomenon of “out-of-body experience” exists and has been studied quite well [7, 16, 18, 20] . A person in this state experiences the sensation of “leaving his own physical body” and often even sees it from the outside (the phenomenon of autoscopy). In this way, the subjective perspective of perception changes – its center is moved to a point outside the physical body and this point, from which the surrounding world is perceived, is often capable of moving more or less arbitrarily in different directions, passing through walls, moving in the air, flying out into space, etc. In some cases of such experiences, the subject feels connected to a certain illusory body, from the position of which he perceives the surrounding world. In other cases, such an illusory body may be absent.

Of course, one can try to explain the phenomenon of out-of-body experience as a special kind of hallucination produced by the brain. However, many researchers of out-of-body experience note the possibility of the subject receiving in this state quite reliable information about the surrounding world, which he could not receive in the usual way [18] , which casts doubt on the theory of hallucinations produced by the brain. But other components of out-of-body experience may not correspond to reality. Most often, this experience is described as a kind of mixture of the “real” and the “unreal” - some objects are perceived quite adequately, and some are changed. In particular, in out-of-body experience there may be elements related to the present, but also to the past and even to the future [18] . This fact of the presence of “unreal” elements of experience, along with “real” ones, can be explained by the fact that in the situation of experiencing an out-of-body experience, as well as in a dream, the restrictions imposed on consciousness by the need to generate reality in accordance with the laws of nature are removed (since consciousness is no longer connected with the function of controlling the movements of the body, and therefore does not have to coordinate its actions with the functions of the brain and the principle of causal closure), and this also violates the condition of intersubjectivity of experience, since otherwise the laws of nature would be violated for other participants in the general “intersubjective dream”, the content of which is the “real” world that we see.

We cannot, of course, claim that the fact of the existence of an "out-of-body experience" strictly proves the independence of phenomenal sensory consciousness from the work of the brain, since the brain is quite functional in this state and, moreover, such states can be induced by electrical stimulation of some parts of the brain. But, at the same time, an "out-of-body experience" occurs precisely under the conditions predicted by the concept of "consciousness outside the brain", namely, under the conditions of the refusal of consciousness to control the movements of the body. For "leaving the body", a necessary condition is maximum muscle relaxation and complete immobility of the body. Sleep paralysis, which disrupts the ability of consciousness to control the movements of the body, can also contribute to this "leaving". Thus, at least the fact of the existence of the phenomenon of "out-of-body experience" can be considered as an indirect argument in favor of the theory of "consciousness outside the brain".

Much stronger arguments in favor of the concept of "consciousness outside the brain" are given by studies of another phenomenon, which also includes elements of "out-of-body experience" - the phenomenon of "near-death experiences". These experiences are described at the end of resuscitation measures by some patients who have suffered clinical death, most often associated with cardiac arrest and cessation of blood circulation, which leads to hypoxia of the brain and cessation of brain activity. Here, autoscopic phenomena are also often described - "leaving the body", observing one's body from the outside, hovering above the body while maintaining the ability to observe and hear others [25] . For example, such patients often quite accurately describe resuscitation procedures that they could not physically observe, since they were in an unconscious (from the point of view of external observers) state. Other experiences more specific to these states are also described: the sensation of flying through a tunnel of light or a narrow passage, meetings with deceased relatives and supernatural “spiritual” beings, a quick review of episodes from a past life, etc. [25] .
Naturalistic scientists try to explain near-death experiences by residual brain activity that still remains in the initial stage of clinical death. However, recent studies [22] , which studied the correlation of the presence of near-death experiences with the duration of the resuscitation procedure, showed that people who were resuscitated fairly quickly do not report any vivid out-of-body experiences, whereas with a longer period of clinical death, when no electrical activity was registered in the brain in the later stages of resuscitation, vivid near-death experiences were indeed experienced in many cases. From this, the authors of this study conclude: "... near-death experiences apparently occur at the very moment when the brain is subject to serious disturbances, this can be considered evidence of the continuity of consciousness outside the brain" [22 p. 1].

If this conclusion is correct, then in the phenomenon of "near-death experiences" we have direct evidence of the theory of "consciousness outside the brain", since consciousness here clearly demonstrates its ability to exist independently of the brain's work. In this situation, consciousness also removes the task of controlling the body by "switching off" the brain and immobilizing the body, and therefore removes the limitations associated with the principle of the causal closure of the physical world.

Since the brain, according to the "Berkeleian ontology", is a kind of "limiter" for the functional capabilities of consciousness (consciousness cannot do what the brain is not capable of doing - in terms of controlling movements, in particular, it is not capable of clearly possessing information that is absent in the brain), then the "liberation" of consciousness from the connection with the body and brain in a state of clinical death should not reduce (due to brain dysfunction), but on the contrary - increase the functional capabilities of consciousness. And they, these capabilities, are potentially limitless (or at least very large). Since it is consciousness that creates reality like the creation of a "dream world", it is precisely it that produces all the details of the sensory world visible to us - from the structure of atoms, molecules and living beings to the work of supercomputers and cosmic phenomena.

But it is precisely this – an increase in the functional capabilities of consciousness – that we often observe in the conditions of near-death experiences. The most striking observation in this regard is that patients who were blind from birth first acquired the ability to see during a near-death experience. Thus, K. Ring and S. Cooper report on interviews with 31 patients who were completely or partially deprived of sight, and yet in a state of clinical death they had a vivid visual experience [27] . In some cases, patients noted a sharp increase in intellectual abilities during near-death experiences [15] .

These facts allow us to make a reasonable choice between the concept of "consciousness outside the brain" and the dualistic solution of the psychophysical problem. As already noted, most of the facts we have considered that speak in favor of the theory of "consciousness outside the brain" can also be explained from the standpoint of dualism - the idea of the existence of an "immaterial" component of consciousness responsible for its properties (quality, individuality, integrity, etc.) that are inexplicable from the standpoint of naturalism (the concept of the generation of consciousness by the brain), and which, together with the brain, participates in the implementation of mental activity. In the case of dualism, the brain is apparently necessary for "enhancing" the comparatively small, initial functional capabilities of consciousness and, consequently, the "liberation" of consciousness from the brain in a state of clinical death in this case should reduce the level of mental activity of consciousness isolated from the brain. The concept of “consciousness outside the brain” under consideration, on the contrary, ascribes to consciousness practically unlimited potential power; the brain here does not enhance, but on the contrary, limits the possibilities of consciousness (consciousness cannot do what the brain cannot do), and thus, one can expect that in a state of “disidentification” with the body, the abilities of consciousness should increase significantly - which we see in the example of the above studies of “near-death experiences”.

Probably, other, even more effective methods of “separation” of consciousness from bodily functions are also possible during life, which are described in religious spiritual practices as states of “enlightenment”, “nirvana”, “moksha”, etc. It is quite possible that in these states consciousness really does acquire omniscience and omnipotence, but at the cost of complete “disidentification” with one’s own body and empirical personality. But when a person comes out of this “enlightened” state, he, as a rule, cannot describe his paranormal experience and transfer this “omniscience” to the ordinary intersubjective plane of existence, since this would again contradict the principle of causal closure of the empirical world - since this experience, if it were verbally expressed, would have no causal explanation within the limits of this empirical world. When trying to translate this information about the “experience of enlightenment” into verbal form, access to it is apparently completely or partially blocked, and this is probably where the idea of the incomprehensibility of the “true reality” that was revealed to the adept in mystical insight arises.

In summary, we can conclude that the proposed "Berkeleian" concept of "consciousness outside the brain" is quite philosophically and scientifically justified, and also has significant explanatory potential. Therefore, it is, at a minimum, worth further research along with other possible approaches to solving the psychophysical problem.

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