The Thucydides Trap and the Nuclear Triangle

The classical “Thucydides Trap” describes a binary conflict: a rising power challenges a dominant one, and the latter’s fear of losing hegemony leads to war. The term originates from a passage by the ancient Greek historian and military commander Thucydides in his History of the Peloponnesian War, where he wrote that the war between Athens and Sparta became inevitable because of the rise of Athens.

In today’s U.S.–China–Russia nuclear triangle, however, this model becomes far more complex. Each state finds itself at a different evolutionary stage (the United States as the dominant hegemon, China as a rapidly rising economic and military superpower, and Russia as a nuclear-parity power seeking to restore its former status and revise the rules of the post-Soviet order), and each possesses the capacity to annihilate the others. This fundamentally changes how we interpret the trap and the pathways for escaping it.

Interpreting the “Thucydides Trap” in the Nuclear Triangle

1. From a Binary Model to Systemic Tension.
The classical “rising versus dominant” framework fractures into multiple axes: U.S.–China, U.S.–Russia, and China–Russia. Russia is not simply a “third party”: with a nuclear arsenal comparable to that of the United States, it amplifies U.S. fears of a coalition of rivals while simultaneously constraining China’s full-scale dominance in Eurasia. Thus, tension arises not between two poles, but within a multipolar system where each actor perceives the growth of the others as a threat to its own security.

2. The Specifics of Nuclear Deterrence.
Nuclear weapons make direct war between great powers suicidal. This changes the nature of the trap: the historical pattern (12 wars in 16 analogous cases) is inapplicable in the form of precedent-setting world wars of the past. The structural tension does not disappear, but it manifests through:

· Hybrid and proxy conflicts (cyberwarfare, disinformation, struggles for spheres of influence, support for allies in local wars);
· Technological arms races (AI, hypersonic weapons, space);
· Economic and technological confrontation (sanctions, trade barriers, battles over 5G standards and semiconductors).

In this interpretation, the “trap” is no longer the mechanical inevitability of a hot war, but the high risk of uncontrolled escalation during a regional crisis (Taiwan, Ukraine, South China Sea) that could, through miscalculation or misjudgment, spiral into a nuclear conflict.

3. Stages of Development and Mutual Fears.

· The United States is at the beginning of the declining branch of mature global hegemony, experiencing the classic Thucydidean fear of China’s rise and Russia’s revanchism.
· China is a rising power demanding a revision of the rules, yet still lacking full nuclear parity with the U.S. in terms of warhead numbers (though rapidly closing the gap), making it vulnerable to strategic pressure.
· Russia possesses the largest nuclear potential and sees itself as a resurgent great power, having lost its imperial status but retained its nuclear “cushion,” and is now challenging the order, perceiving NATO expansion as an existential threat (its own “fear”).

Consequently, each side simultaneously experiences fear and seeks revision, rendering the model trilateral rather than binary.

How the Three Nuclear Powers Can Avoid the Trap

The key lies in the conscious use of nuclear deterrence as a safeguard and the creation of mechanisms to reduce structural stress.

1. Upholding the “Nuclear Taboo” as the Supreme Value.
Based on the understanding that a nuclear war among them would be suicidal, leaders must publicly and unambiguously reaffirm the principle that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” (affirmed by Reagan and Gorbachev, and later by the leaders of the five nuclear-weapon states in 2022). This serves as the ideological foundation for restraint.

2. Permanent and Multi-Channel Lines of Communication.
Unlike ancient Athens and Sparta, modern powers can prevent escalation through direct dialogue. This requires:

· Hotlines between militaries (akin to the U.S.-Russia hotline established after the Cuban Missile Crisis);
· Regular U.S.–China and NATO–Russia strategic dialogues on arms control;
· Informal expert contact tracks (Track II diplomacy) to overcome the demonization of the opponent and distrust.

3. Managing Regional Proxy Crises through “Rules of the Game.”
The trap is often sprung by minor conflicts on the periphery. To avoid this, there is a need to:

· Develop codes of conduct in dangerous domains (air, sea, and cyberspace), similar to the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement;
· Clearly designate “red lines,” but avoid multiplying them unnecessarily so as not to provoke an accidental clash.

4. Preserving and Modernizing the Arms Control Architecture.
An arms race amplifies structural stress. Renewing negotiations on limiting strategic offensive arms (extending New START between Russia and the U.S., bringing China into future rounds), moratoriums on the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe and Asia, and agreements on the non-deployment of weapons in space all reduce the intensity of mutual fear.

5. Economic Interdependence as a Stabilizer (with a Security Caveat).
Economic interdependence changes the logic of the trap. However, post-2022, it has become clear that asymmetric dependence can be weaponized. The solution is to build mutually beneficial yet diversified ties, where a rupture would be equally painful for all, and to clearly separate economic disputes from military-security issues so that trade wars do not escalate into hot wars.

6. Joint Work on Global Challenges.
Recognizing shared threats (climate change, pandemics, global financial instability) can create a “positive agenda” in which cooperation outweighs rivalry. This lowers the psychological temperature by forming a habit of cooperation and diminishing the image of an enemy.

Thus, within the nuclear triangle, the “Thucydides Trap” transforms from a death sentence of major war into a complex challenge of managing multipolar competition. It can be avoided only through a combination of strategic deterrence (which prevents war through the fear of annihilation) and deliberate diplomacy that does not allow fear and pride to cloud rational calculation. As critics rightly note, the situation in the history of the Peloponnesian War was more complex than the Thucydides Trap suggests, and understanding that very complexity is the key to not repeating its tragic scenario.